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Abstract 
When tertiary education is subsidized the cost of poor student performance 
in university subjects falls not only on the individual student but also on society in 
general. Society therefore has an interest in promoting student performance. 
There is evidence in the literature that absenteeism from university classes is 
widespread and that absenteeism adversely affects student performance. In this 
paper I describe an incentive scheme that increased attendance of business and 
economics students in an introductory statistics subject at a typical Australian 
university. Like other authors I find a strong positive association between 
attendance and academic performance, both in the presence and absence of the 
scheme. However, there is no evidence that the incentive scheme caused student 
performance to improve. Although students attended more classes they did not 
perform better than students in the previous year’s class who had the same 
observable characteristics and attendance levels but who were not exposed to the 
scheme.  
Key words: class attendance, class absenteeism, academic performance 
JEL codes: A22, I21 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Both in North America and Australia substantial numbers of university 
students regularly skip classes. Romer (1993, p. 167) described absenteeism 
in economics subjects at three “relatively elite” U.S. universities as “rampant”, 
having found that approximately one third of students were absent from class 
on a given day. Absenteeism among Romer’s sample of students was higher 
in large classes than in small classes, lower in classes with a substantial 
mathematical content than in non-mathematical classes, higher in core 
subjects than in noncompulsory electives, and lower in classes taught by 
experienced academic staff than in classes taught by casual lecturers. 
Devadoss and Foltz (1996) observed students studying agricultural 
economics and agribusiness and found that class attendance was positively 
related to the ability and motivation of the student. Several other results also 
emerged from Devadoss and Foltz’ study. Students financing their own 
studies through work or student loans had better attendance records than 
students on scholarship or students who were financially supported by their 
parents. Classes taught by lecturers who had won teaching awards and 
classes taught by lecturers who used an interactive teaching style were better 
attended than other classes. Classes scheduled between 10am and 3pm 
were better attended than classes scheduled either earlier or later.  
Most academics believe intuitively that students benefit from attending 
classes. This is not simply egotism on the part of academics; there is 
evidence to suggest that attendance does matter for academic achievement. 
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Devadoss and Foltz (1996) found that students who attended all classes in 
agricultural economics and agribusiness achieved (on average) a full letter 
grade higher than students who attended no more than 50 percent of the 
same classes. Durden and Ellis (1995) reported a nonlinear relationship 
between attendance and performance: missing a few classes seemed not to 
matter but students who missed more than four classes in a one-semester 
principles of economics subject performed at a significantly lower level than 
students who attended all classes. Romer (1993) found that attendance had a 
significant, positive impact on students’ performance in a one-semester 
intermediate macroeconomics subject. An average-GPA student in Romer’s 
sample who attended all classes was predicted to score a B+, compared with 
a C+ for a student who attended 25 percent of classes. Park and Kerr (1990) 
found that attendance was significant in determining the odds of avoiding a D 
grade in a money and banking subject. Schmidt (1983) analyzed performance 
of students taking macroeconomic principles and found time spent in lectures 
and time spent in discussion groups had a significant, positive effect on 
performance. None of these studies proves that a causal relationship exists 
between attendance and performance but they document a strong association 
and are consistent with the hypothesis that such a causal relationship exists. 
Given the evidence that absenteeism is common and that it may 
impede performance, it is worthwhile considering ways to encourage class 
attendance. Compulsory attendance is difficult to enforce although Romer 
(1993, p. 173) reminds us that a generation ago attendance both in principle 
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and in practice was mandatory in some U.S. universities. Short of compulsion, 
incentives of various types, such as points for class participation or 
unannounced quizzes that contribute to the final grade, can be used to 
discourage absenteeism. Devadoss and Foltz (1996) found that incentives of 
this sort have a significant, positive impact on attendance.  
Monitoring attendance poses logistical problems for large classes. In 
Australian universities, large lectures are common, particularly for subjects at 
the 100 level.1 Small classes tend to be associated with lectures in elective 
subjects, many of which are offered at the 200 or 300 level, and with tutorials, 
which typically are conducted as small discussion groups. Australian 
academic staff and students seem to regard tutorial attendance as at least as 
important as lecture attendance, possibly because tutorials offer a greater 
opportunity for student participation. This paper examines the effectiveness of 
one method used by the author to encourage small-group tutorial attendance 
at a typical Australian university. In Section II the incentive scheme is 
described along with the circumstances in which it was used. The effect of the 
incentive scheme on attendance rates is examined in Section III. In Section IV 
the incentive scheme is evaluated as a mechanism for improving 
performance. Section V summarizes the conclusions of the study.  
 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE INCENTIVE SCHEME 
The incentive scheme described in this paper was used in the late 1990s 
in a one-semester, introductory statistics subject taught to undergraduates at a 
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medium size Australian university. Approximately 85 percent of the several 
hundred students in the class each semester are undertaking a Bachelor of 
Commerce degree (specializing in business or economics) and for these 
students the subject is compulsory. Most of the remaining 15 percent of 
students are enrolled in an Arts degree, for some of whom the subject is 
compulsory while for others it is not. At the time of this study there were three 
50-minute lectures per week for 14 weeks delivered to the class as a whole. 
Each student was also required to attend one 50-minute tutorial in each of 
Weeks 2 through 14. Tutorial groups consisted of 20 or fewer students. 
Students were instructed to attempt a problem set prior to each tutorial. The 
problems involved the application of material covered in lectures in the 
preceding week. Nine of the 13 tutorial meetings were held in a regular 
classroom where a tutor presented the answers to as many of the problems as 
time permitted and responded to students’ questions. Students were not 
required to submit their answers for marking but they could mark their own work 
using an answer key, which was made available at the beginning of the week 
following the tutorial in which the problem set was discussed. The remaining 
four tutorial meetings were held in a computer laboratory where students, with 
the help of their tutor, learned how to use a statistical package to generate 
output with which to solve statistical problems.  
Under the incentive scheme each student’s mark for the subject as a 
whole was reduced by one percentage point for every tutorial missed in 
excess of two. (No penalty was applied for an absence if the student 
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submitted written documentation, such as a medical certificate, in evidence of 
a legitimate reason for non-attendance.) An effort was made to ensure that 
students understood the incentive scheme: it was explained in the subject 
outline, copies of which were distributed in lectures and made available on the 
Web at the beginning of the semester. The scheme was explained to students 
during the first lecture and students were reminded of its existence on several 
occasions during the semester.  
The efficacy of the incentive scheme is evaluated in Section III by 
comparing tutorial attendance rates in the semester when the scheme was 
used, with those of the same semester in the previous year when the scheme 
was not used. The two years are referred to below as the “trial year” and the 
“control year”, respectively. This methodology is valid only if the teaching 
environment is the same in both years. Before presenting the analysis, 
therefore, it is appropriate to compare the subject and its organization in the 
two years. 
(a)  The lecturer was the same in both years. 
(b)  The content and presentation of lectures was fundamentally the same 
in both years. The same topics were presented using PowerPoint slides. The 
only change made to lecture content was to update some of the examples.  
(c)  The method of assessment was the same in both years except for the 
incentive scheme. There were three tests during the semester, worth 15 
percent, 10 percent and 15 percent respectively, and a comprehensive final 
examination, worth 60 percent. Tests had the same coverage of material, 
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were of the same duration and were conducted at the same time during the 
semester in both years. Test 1 was multiple-choice, Test 2 consisted of 
problems similar to those assigned as tutorial preparation and Test 3 
assessed knowledge of the output generated by the statistical package used 
in the subject. The questions asked on the tests and the final examination 
were different in the two years but were intended to be of the same level of 
difficulty.  
(d)  The same head tutor was employed in both years. In the trial year the 
head tutor conducted seven of the eleven tutorial groups; in the control year 
the head tutor taught six of the eleven tutorial groups.2 Accurate records of 
tutorial attendance were kept in both years. In the trial year students signed 
an attendance sheet; in the control year a roll call was taken in each tutorial.  
(e)  The problems assigned as tutorial preparation were taken from the 
textbook, which was the same in both years. All problems assigned in the trial 
year were also assigned in the control year but five of the 175 problems 
assigned in the control year were omitted in the trial year. 
(f)  Two weeks into the semester in the trial year there were 226 students 
in the class, 12.4 percent of whom later withdrew. At the same point in time in 
the control year there were 189 students enrolled in the subject, 12.1 percent 
of whom later withdrew.3  
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III. THE EFFECT OF THE INCENTIVE SCHEME ON ATTENDANCE 
Data sets for the two years were constructed using official class lists 
and records of attendance kept by the tutors. Students who had withdrawn 
from the subject by the end of the second week were excluded from the 
analysis because these students did not seriously attempt the subject.4 The 
analysis reported in the first part of this section was performed on the 
remaining students, including those who withdrew after the end of the second 
week. It was recognized that the incentive scheme might encourage students 
with a propensity to miss tutorials to withdraw from the subject altogether. If 
so, excluding these students from the analysis would lead to an under-
representation of low-attendance students in the trial year and an upward bias 
in any observed improvement in the attendance rate compared with the 
control year. In fact, as already mentioned in Item (f) within Section II, the 
withdrawal rate was approximately the same in both years so this theoretical 
possibility does not appear to have been the case. The data set is referred to 
below as “All Students”.  
Some of the students who eventually withdrew (13 in the year when the 
incentive scheme was used and 8 in the control year) attended no tutorials. 
Whether these students seriously attempted the subject prior to withdrawal is 
unknown. On the assumption that they did not, the analysis was repeated with 
these students excluded from it.  This second data set is called “>0-Tut 
Students” below. Finally, for completeness, the analysis was repeated using 
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only students who remained enrolled until the end of the semester. This third 
data set is called “No-WD Students”.5 
Each student’s attendance was determined from the tutor’s records. An 
absence that was excused for assessment purposes was not counted as an 
attendance for this study because an incentive scheme cannot be judged 
successful if it simply encourages students to document their absences rather 
than reduce them.  
 The percentages of students in the three data sets who attended 0, 1, 
2, … 13 tutorials in the two years are presented in Table I. The percentage of 
students with “good” attendance records was higher in the year when the 
incentive scheme was used than in the control year. The percentage of “All 
Students” who attended all 13 tutorials in the trial year was 16.8 compared 
with 12.7 percent in the control year. Almost 35 percent of “All Students” 
missed no more than one tutorial in the trial year compared with 21.7 percent 
in the control year. Almost 50 percent of  “All Students” missed no more than 
two tutorials in the trial year compared with 37 percent in the control year. The 
proportion of students with poor attendance records was lower in the year 
when the incentive scheme was used than in the control year. The percentage 
of “All Students” who attended six or fewer of the 13 tutorials in the trial year 
was 23.5 compared with 33.3 percent in the control year. Only among the 
chronically absent was attendance worse in the year when the incentive 
scheme was used: 7.5 percent of  “All Students” missed all 13 tutorials in the 
trial year compared with 5.8 percent in the control year. Attendance-rate 
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differentials of similar magnitude between the two years apply to the “>0-Tut 
Students” and the “No WD Students”. Wilcoxan Rank-Sum tests6 performed 
on the three data sets in Table I all indicate that the distribution of attendance 
in the control year is located below the distribution of attendance in the year 
when the incentive scheme was used. These results are all statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level. 
    {Table I about here.} 
 The average attendance in the year when the incentive scheme was 
used was 10.079 (out of 13) tutorials, compared with 8.899 in the control year. 
I now examine whether the increase in attendance can be explained by 
differences in the nature of the students in the two years. Descriptive statistics 
for students in the two groups are shown in Table II.7  The average mark on 
other subjects taken in the same semester as my class is a proxy for the 
ability of the student. The number of credit points taken until the end of the 
semester and the number of credit points dropped during the semester reflect 
the students involvement in university study.8 These variables, as well as full-
fee paying status9 and the time at which the tutorial was held, were found to 
be important determinants of attendance in the Devadoss and Foltz’ study that 
was discussed in the introduction to this paper. First-year status10, gender and 
type of degree undertaken are also considered. The only differences between 
the two years that are significant at the five percent level are mean tutorial 
attendance and mean number of credit points recorded at the end of the 
semester. 
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    {Table II about here.} 
 By how much did the attendance of a typical student increase as a 
result of the incentive scheme? Table III reports the results of an OLS 
regression analysis of the effect of the incentive scheme on attendance (see 
Columns 1 and 2) and the marginal effects from a Tobit estimation (see 
Columns 3 and 4). The OLS and Tobit results are very similar. The effect of 
the incentive scheme is to increase attendance by approximately one tutorial, 
a result that is highly statistically significant. Only three other coefficients in 
the attendance equation are statistically significant: other things equal, 
students with high average marks in other subjects taken during the same 
semester have higher tutorial attendance rates, first-year students attend 
more tutorials than later-year students, and males skip more tutorials than 
females. Having a tutorial either early or late in the day had no significant 
effect on attendance, probably because students selected their own tutorial 
times. Being a full-fee-paying student had no significant effect on attendance. 
Students who dropped credit points during the semester had much the same 
attendance as students who maintained the same workload throughout the 
semester.   
    {Table III about here.} 
 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE INCENTIVE SCHEME ON PERFORMANCE 
If attending tutorials increases learning then the reduction in 
absenteeism documented in this paper is to be applauded. A causal link 
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between attendance and performance is difficult to identify statistically 
because students choose whether to attend class. Missing class could be a 
rational act by a student who is unable to assimilate information aurally and 
substitutes study for class attendance. Alternatively, absenteeism could 
constitute self-destructive behaviour resulting from lack of motivation, a high 
time preference for leisure or poor time-management skills. These underlying 
factors are difficult to incorporate into a formal analysis of the relationship 
between attendance and performance because they are difficult to measure. If 
each student’s attendance could be set using a random process then a 
regression of performance on attendance (and other relevant variables) would 
be able to detect a causal relationship, if one exists. In the absence of such 
an experiment, I examine (a) the association between the tutorial attendance 
and performance in both years and (b) the association between the incentive 
scheme and student performance at various levels of attendance.  
The incentive scheme can be viewed as a mechanism for increasing 
the marginal benefit of attending tutorials but its efficacy depends upon the 
nature of the performance-attendance relationship for the two groups of 
students.11 The performance-attendance relationship in the control year can 
be used to estimate what the performance of students subjected to the 
incentive scheme would have been, had the incentive scheme not been used. 
An upward shift in the relationship between the two years would indicate that 
the scheme was successful. That is, performance would have increased 
beyond what could be attributed to increased exposure to the subject matter 
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associated with increased attendance. This could occur if students discover 
that Statistics is interesting and devote more effort to studying the material. If 
the performance-attendance relationship is strictly increasing and the same in 
both years then the scheme could also be judged a success in the sense that 
it increased performance via the additional exposure to material associated 
with attending an additional tutorial. However, a downward shift in the 
relationship between the control year and the trial year would indicate that the 
incentive scheme was unsuccessful. Under the latter scenario, students 
attend more tutorials as a result of the incentive scheme but do not perform 
better because of a negatively compensating reduction of effort.  
To produce a measure of academic performance for this paper that is 
not directly affected by the incentive scheme I added back on to the final 
marks of students in the trial year any marks that were deducted for 
absenteeism.  When this was done, there was no significant difference 
between the mean marks of 52.92 in the year when the incentive scheme was 
used and 53.59 in the control year. 
Table IV reports the results of a regression analysis of the effect of 
tutorial attendance on performance. The two years of data were pooled and a 
dummy variable was used to indicate the presence or absence of the 
incentive scheme. Attendance was represented by 13 dummy variables, the 
omitted category being perfect attendance. Interactions between the dummy 
variable for the incentive scheme and the dummy variables for attendance 
were included, thereby allowing the performance-attendance relationship to 
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differ for the two groups of students (see columns 1 through 4 in the top 
section of Table IV).12 Columns 5 and 6 list the differences between the 
coefficients in the two years and the P-values of the differences.  
    {Table IV about here.} 
Like the studies reported in the introduction to this paper, the results in 
Table IV depict a direct relationship between attendance and performance in 
both years. This is evident in the negative and statistically significant, 
coefficients on the attendance dummies in each year. In the control year, 
students with 1, 2 or 3 absences performed approximately the same as 
students who attended all 13 tutorials but students who missed 4 or 5 tutorials 
scored approximately 12 fewer marks than students with perfect attendance. 
An additional 10 to 12 marks were forfeited by students absent from 6 or 7 
tutorials. In the trial year, the first three absences “cost” the student 
approximately eight marks each. In both years students who attended five or 
fewer tutorials scored approximately 30 fewer marks than students with 
perfect attendance.  
Four of the six independent variables included in the regression are 
statistically significant at approximately the five percent level or lower. The first 
independent variable, the student’s average mark (out of 100) in other 
subjects taken during the same semester as my subject, is a proxy for ability 
but it probably also reflects attendance in those other subjects. Assuming 
attendance is correlated across subjects, the inclusion of this variable is likely 
to result in an under-estimate of the effect of tutorial attendance on 
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performance in my class.13 The second independent is a dummy variable for 
students in their first year at university. Assuming the transition from high 
school to university requires some adjustment it was hypothesized that first-
year students would perform at a lower level than later-year students. This 
hypothesis is supported by the data: first-year students, on average, scored 
6.3 marks lower than later-year students. The third independent variable is a 
dummy variable for students who pay full fees. The assumption is that these 
private students are more motivated or perhaps better prepared academically 
than students whose tuition is subsidized. The results support this hypothesis; 
full-fee paying students scored four marks higher than their subsidized 
counterparts. The fourth independent variable is the number of credit points 
taken by the student in the current semester. Assuming that more motivated 
students take more credit points, this independent variable is expected to be 
positively related to performance. This expectation is confirmed by the positive 
coefficient on current credit points. No significant differences were found 
between the performances of males and females, nor between the 
performances of students undertaking a Bachelor of Commerce degree and 
those enrolled in other degrees. 
An assessment of the efficacy of the incentive scheme in increasing 
learning requires a comparison of the performance-attendance relationships 
of a typical student in the two years. The relationship is implicit in the 
coefficients of the attendance dummies in Table IV. An explicit example is 
provided in Table V, which has been constructed using the coefficients in 
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Table IV and the assumption that a typical student has an mean mark of 57 on 
other subjects taken in the same semester, is not in first-year, is not paying full 
fees, is enrolled in 24 credit points at the end of the semester, is female and is 
enrolled in a Bachelor of Commerce degree. Profiles of students with other 
characteristics that are included as independent variables in Table IV would 
differ from the profile in Table V only by the addition, or subtraction, of a 
constant to performance at each level of attendance. 
    {Table V about here.} 
Was the incentive scheme successful in increasing performance?  
Apparently not! There is certainly no upward shift in the performance-
attendance relationship from the control year to the year in which the incentive 
scheme was used. The two profiles are statistically indistinguishable at all 
attendance levels except ten, where the penalty applied, and eleven, where 
the penalty did not apply (see Column 6 of Table IV). At these two attendance 
levels performance was significantly lower under the incentive scheme. This 
suggests that there were students in the trial year who attended eleven rather 
than ten tutorials in an effort to avoid the penalty, but who learned no more 
than they would have done if they had attended only ten tutorials. This 
behaviour resulted in a decrease in the performances of students with 
attendances of ten and eleven, compared with students in the control year.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented in this paper is that tutorial attendance in an 
introductory statistics class improved by approximately one tutorial under an 
incentive scheme that imposed a small penalty for missing more than two out 
of 13 tutorials. A priori, it was not known whether students would respond to 
the incentive scheme. They may not have believed that the penalty for not 
attending tutorials would actually be applied, they may not have cared enough 
about their academic grades for the penalty to matter, or the penalty may 
have been too small to be effective.  
There was a positive association between tutorial attendance and 
performance of students both in the year when the incentive scheme was 
used and in the previous year when the incentive scheme was not in force. 
This is consistent with the evidence from U.S. universities. Nevertheless, the 
incentive scheme did not improve students’ performance. Students attended 
more classes but did not perform better than students with the same 
characteristics and attendance levels in the previous year when the scheme 
was not used. At some attendance levels, students performed worse. Clearly, 
attendance per se does not ensure that learning takes place. Physical 
presence and intellectual involvement are quite different phenomena. My 
results suggest that there are no “easy fixes” in dealing with absenteeism but 
they do not rule out the possibility that other types of incentives may be 
effective in increasing both attendance and performance. More information is 
needed on why students skip classes and how they utilize the time so gained.  
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Table I 
  
Tutorial Attendance Rates (%) 
 
              
       All Students 
                 
 >0-Tut Students 
            
 No-WD Students No. of 
Tutorials 
Attended Control Yr Trial Yr Control Yr Trial Yr Control Yr Trial Yr
0 5.8 7.5 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.0
1 3.2 1.8 3.3 1.9 1.8 1.0
2 5.3 2.2 5.5 2.3 5.4 1.5
3 6.9 3.5 7.2 3.8 4.8 1.5
4 4.2 2.7 4.4 2.8 3.0 1.0
5 5.8 4.0 6.1 4.2 6.0 3.5
6 2.1 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.0
7 5.8 5.3 6.1 5.6 6.0 6.1
8 6.3 3.5 6.6 3.8 6.6 4.0
9 7.4 8.4 7.7 8.9 8.4 9.6
10 10.1 9.3 10.5 9.9 11.4 10.6
11 15.3 15.0 16.0 16.0 17.5 17.2
12 9.0 18.1 9.4 19.2 10.2 20.7
13 12.7 16.8 13.3 17.8 14.5 19.2
Wilcoxan Rank-Sum Tests 
No. of Students 189 226 181 213 166 198
Mean Rank 190.2 222.9 177.1 214.8 162.2 199.5
Approx Z-statistic -2.7694 -3.2765 -3.3649 
P-value 0.0028 0.0005 0.0004 
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Control Year Trial Year 
Mean  
(Standard  Deviation)   
Number  of tutorials attended    8.899*** 
(3.540) 
  10.079*** 
(2.947) 
Average mark on other subjects in the 
same semester (%) 
57.061 
(15.498) 
57.415 
(14.538) 
Credit points at end of semester    21.522*** 
(4.770) 
   23.068*** 
(3.816) 
Credit points dropped during semester 0.591 
(2.081) 
0.545 
(1.857) 
Proportion   
In 1st-year   0.403 0.455 
Paying full fees 0.321 0.246 
Male 0.629 0.618 
Not in B.Com degree 0.176 0.131 
In a tutorial between 9.30am & 3.30pm 0.566 0.581 
In a tutorial at 8.30am 0.063 0.073 
In a tutorial at 4.30pm 0.277 0.272 
In a tutorial at 5.30pm 0.094 0.073 
No. of observations 159 191 
 
*** Significantly different from each other at the 0.1 percent level of significance. 
**  Significantly different from each other at the 1 percent level of significance. 
 *   Significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level of significance. 
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Table III 
Effect of the Incentive Scheme on Attendance+ 
Variable Coeff
(OLS) 
 
(1) 
P-
value 
 
(2) 
Marg 
Effect 
(Tobit) 
(3) 
P-
value 
 
(4) 
Intercept 2.168 0.001 1.154 0084 
Incentive Scheme = 1, 0 otherwise 1.107 0.000 1.041 0.000 
Average mark on other subjects in the 
same semester 0.119 0.000 0.115 0.000 
1st-year  student = 1, 0 otherwise 1.036 0.000 1.113 0.000 
Full-fee paying student = 1, 0 otherwise 0.340 0.284 0.277 0.384 
Credit points dropped during semester -0.109 0.132 -0.105 0.141 
Male=1, 0 otherwise -0.710 0.014 -0.615 0.034 
In a tutorial at 8.30am = 1, 0 otherwise -0.622 0.270 -0.443 0.441 
In a tutorial at 4.30pm = 1, 0 otherwise -0.134 0.681 -0.139 0.670 
In a tutorial at 5.30pm = 1, 0 otherwise 0.310 0.555 0.270 0.608 
     
+ The dependent variable is the number of tutorials attended out of 13. 
Sample Size = 350 (159 in the control year and 191 in the trial year) 
OLS Regression 
R2 = 0.387,  Adjusted-R2 = 0.370,  F-statistic = 23.81 (P-value = 0.000), 
Breusch-Pagan’s chi-square statistic (with 9 degrees of freedom) = 13.15 
(P-value = 0.156). The null hypothesis (homoscedasticity) is not rejected. 
Tobit Estimation 
Limits = 0 and 13, sigma = 3.003, (P-value = 0.000). 
Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. 
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Table IV 
The Effect of Attendance on Performance+ 
 
 Control Year Trial Year Difference 
Trial Yr – Control Yr 
Variables interacting with the 
dummy for the incentive scheme 
Coeff 
(1) 
P-value 
(2) 
Coeff 
(3) 
P-value 
(4) 
Coeff 
(5) = (3) – (1)  
P-value 
(6) 
Intercept 16.795 0.026 19.240 0.012 2.446 0.442 
12 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -4.694 0.335 -7.701 0.012 -3.007 0.591 
11 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise 0.141 0.964 -14.907 0.000 -15.048 0.002 
10 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -3.968 0.276 -23.820 0.000 -19.851 0.001 
9 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -12.567 0.011 -19.309 0.000 -6.742 0.301 
8 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -12.064 0.106 -28.684 0.000 -16.620 0.094 
7 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -22.228 0.027 -33.353 0.000 -11.125 0.324 
6 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -24.500 0.023 -21.306 0.049 3.194 0.833 
5 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -31.092 0.000 -32.985 0.003 -1.893 0.880 
4 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -41.140 0.000 -37.585 0.000 3.556 0.793 
3 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -34.268 0.000 -33.780 0.000 0.488 0.969 
2 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -31.581 0.000 -46.260 0.000 -14.679 0.212 
1 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -16.667 0.159 -19.773 0.002 -3.106 0.792 
0 tutorials = 1,   0 otherwise -48.692 0.000 -40.816 0.000 7.876 0.224 
 
Independent variables without Interactions Coeff P-value     
Avg mark on other subjects  
taken in the same semester  0.628 0.000    
1st-year student = 1,   0 otherwise  -6.309 0.001    
Full-fee paying student = 1,  
0 otherwise  4.026 0.053    
Credit points at end of semester  0.735 0.001    
Male=1,   0 otherwise  -2.662 0.139    
Not B.Commerce =1,   0 otherwise  -0.424 0.883    
 
+ The dependent variable is performance out of 100.  
Sample Size = 350 (159 in the control year and 191 the trial year).  
R2 = 0.592,  Adjusted-R2 = 0.550,  F-statistic = 13.91 (P-value = 0.000), 
Breusch-Pagan’s chi-square statistic (with 33 degrees of freedom) = 77.678 (P-value = 0.000). 
Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s consistent estimator (see Greene, 1998, p.291). 
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Table V 
Performance - Attendance Profiles of a Typical Student+ 
 
 Mark (100) 
Attendance Control Year 
 
Trial Year  
 
13 tutorials  70 73 
12 tutorials  66 65 
11 tutorials       70***      58*** 
10 tutorials       66***      49*** 
9 tutorials  58 53 
8 tutorials  58 44 
7 tutorials  48 39 
6 tutorials  46 51 
5 tutorials  39 40 
4 tutorials  29 35 
3 tutorials  36 39 
2 tutorials  39 26 
1 tutorials  54 53 
0 tutorials  22 32 
 
+   These profiles have been constructed using the coefficients in Table IV.  
A typical student has an mean mark of 57 on other subjects taken in the same 
semester, is not in first-year, is not paying full fees, is enrolled in 24 credit points at 
the end of the semester, is female and is enrolled in a Bachelor of Commerce 
degree. 
***  Significantly different from each other at the 0.1 percent level of significance. 
**   Significantly different from each other at the 1 percent level of significance.  
*    Significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level of significance. 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                            
 
1  Australian university degrees require three years of full-time study. 
Students enrolled in a given subject typically attend the same set of lectures, 
whereas in many American universities a number of small sections are 
scheduled for the same subject. For further description and a comparison of 
Australian and U.S. undergraduate study, see Siegfried and Round (1994) 
and Lee, Burgess and Kniest (1996).  
 
2  In the year when the incentive scheme was used two casual tutors took 
two tutorial groups each. In the previous year two casual tutors took three and 
two groups, respectively.  Different casual tutors were employed in the two 
years but in each year one of the casual tutors had tutored in the subject at 
least once before. 
 
3  In the control year, for the convenience of part-time students, each 
lecture was repeated at 6.30pm on the same day it was first delivered and one 
tutorial per week was held at 7.30pm. There was no repeat lecture or 
associated tutorial in the year when the incentive scheme was used. 
Unfortunately, the roll book for the 7.30pm tutorial in the control year was 
mislaid so no record of attendance for its 19 enrollees is available. The 
enrolment count for the control year of 189 and the analysis presented here 
excludes these 19 students. I contend that their omission does not bias the 
results of the analysis for the following reason. This subject in introductory 
statistics is taught in both semesters at my university and in the year when the 
incentive scheme was used the repeat lecture was given in the semester 
taught by another lecturer. Assuming that part-time, mature students take the 
subject in the semester when the repeat lecture is offered then the 19 students 
in the 7.30pm tutorial in the control year are likely to behave differently from 
the students in the following year’s class. (Indeed, 17 of the 19 students were 
part time and only one was in his first year at university.) Thus, their exclusion 
is likely to increase the similarity between students in the two classes. 
 
4  In the first two weeks of each semester a considerable amount of 
“subject sampling” takes place as students finalize decisions about which 
subjects to take. Students can drop subjects and avoid fees until the middle of 
the fifth week of the semester; they can drop without having an F recorded on 
their academic transcript prior to the end of Week 8. 
 
5  There were three students in the control year and four in the year when 
the incentive scheme was used who did not withdraw yet attended no 
tutorials. These students are included in all three data sets analyzed here. 
 
6  The null hypothesis is that the relative-frequency distribution of 
attendance in the control year is not located to the left of the relative-
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frequency distribution of attendance in the year when the incentive scheme 
was used. 
 
7  Table II was constructed using 191 of the 198 “No-WD Students” in the  
data set for the year when the incentive scheme was used and 159 of the 166 
“No-WD Students” in the data set for the control year. Seven students from 
each data set were excluded because they were enrolled in no other subject 
and consequently have no observed  “average mark on other subjects in the 
same semester”. The analysis in Section IV is also based upon these 350 
students. 
 
8  The normal load is 24 credit points; 30 credit points constitute a heavy 
load. A student taking fewer than 18 credit points is considered to be part-
time. 
 
9  In the Australian context at the time of this study most full-fee-paying 
students were international students. 
 
10  First-year students were identified from class lists by the first two digits 
of their identification numbers, which indicate the first year of enrolment.  
 
11  I thank an anonymous referee for his or her suggestions as to how to 
assess the efficacy of the incentive scheme.  
  
12  Separate regressions for the two years found no statistically significant 
differences between the coefficients of the control variables so the interactions 
between the incentive-scheme dummy and the independent variables were 
not included in the model reported in Table IV. 
 
13  This point is made by Romer (1993, p.172) and by Park and Kerr 
(1990, pp.105-108).  
